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Unconditionally secure bit commitment is forbidden by quantum mechanics. We extend this no-go
theorem to continuous-variable protocols where both players are restricted to use Gaussian states and
operations, which is a reasonable assumption in current-state optical implementations. Our Gaussian
no-go theorem also provides a natural counter-example to a conjecture that quantum mechanics can
be rederived from the assumption that key distribution is allowed while bit commitment is forbidden
in Nature.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Bit commitment is a cryptographic primitive with a
large scope of applications ranging from two-party secure
computation, e.g., secure authentication, to coin flipping.
It involves two mistrustful parties: Alice must commit to
a certain bit, which should remain hidden to Bob until
she reveals its value. A traditional picture for this proto-
col is as follows: Alice locks a secret bit into a safe that
she gives to Bob; then, when she wants to reveal her se-
cret, she simply hands over the key of the safe to Bob. A
bit commitment protocol is said to be secure if it prevents
Alice to cheat (i.e., she cannot change the value of the
bit she had commited) and Bob to cheat (i.e., he cannot
learn information about the bit before Alice reveals it).
This primitive has been exhaustively studied in classi-
cal cryptography, where the security relies on unproven
computational assumptions [1, 2]. The idea of quantum
bit commitment (QBC) was first introduced by Bennett
and Brassard in 1984 [3], together with the famous BB84
quantum key distribution protocol. In 1993, Brassard et
al. proposed a QBC protocol known as BCJL [4], which
was believed to be secure until 1996, when Mayers [5]
and independently Lo and Chau [6] proved that it was
not the case. Their proof involved a reduction of the
BCJL protocol to a purified protocol, which cannot be
perfectly secure against both Alice and Bob. Thus, it
appeared that this reduction precludes the existence of
an unconditionally secure QBC protocol. Because of the
complexity of this reduction, however, it was not univer-
sally accepted (see, e.g., [7]) until 2006, when d’Ariano
et al. provided a complete, formal description of QBC
protocols that definitely closed the question [8]. This is
the content of the no-go theorem for QBC.
Interestingly, this situation is in sharp contrast with
quantum key distribution, for which unconditionally se-
cure protocols have been exhibited [9]. These two facts,
namely the possibility of key distribution and impossibil-
ity of bit commitment, seem to be specific to quantum
mechanics, and were conjectured by Brassard and Fuchs
to be actually sufficient to rederive quantum mechan-
ics from first principles [10]. This conjecture was later
proven wrong, but Clifton et al. proved instead that the
assumptions of no-signalling, no-broadcasting, and the
impossibility of bit commitment make it work within the
framework of C∗-algebras [11]. This is known as the CBH
theorem.
Coming back to the no-go theorem for QBC, let us
stress that it only applies to unconditionally secure pro-
tocols, that is, to the case where Alice and Bob have no
restriction on their capabilities except those dictated by
quantum mechanics. This leaves the door open to QBC
protocols that could be secure under reasonable assump-
tions on Alice and Bob’s capabilities. Such protocols were
found in the bounded-storage model [12] or by exploiting
the constraints imposed by special relativity [13].
In this Letter, we address QBC protocols with contin-
uous variables, and explore whether such protocols may
be found secure when both parties are restricted to use
Gaussian states and operations. Most quantum infor-
mation protocols to date have been based on discrete
variables in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. Recently,
however, continuous variables (CV) have been proven to
be a very powerful alternative approach [14]. In the case
of optical communication, for example, the quadrature
components of the light field make especially useful con-
tinuous variables because of their associated detection
scheme, namely homodyne detection. This is well illus-
trated with CV quantum key distribution, which was re-
cently proven unconditionaly secure [15] and appears as a
credible alternative to single-photon based quantum key
distribution [16]. Dealing with CV quantum informa-
tion protocols unfortunately comes with a price, namely
that their analysis may be intractable as an infinite-
dimensional Hilbert space is involved.
An elegant solution consists in restricting the analysis
to so-called Gaussian states and operations, which, apart
from being efficiently characterizable within the appro-
priate formalism, can be relatively easily manipulated in
the laboratory. It is therefore a very natural and im-
ar
X
iv
:0
90
5.
34
19
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  6
 Ja
n 2
01
0
2portant question to ask whether QBC protocols can be
built with continuous variables, which could be made se-
cure if both parties are capable to manipulate Gaussian
states only. Remember that, although the no-go theorem
for unconditional security holds for infinite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces as such, it is unknown whether secure
QBC can exist when both parties have restricted capabil-
ities. Here, we answer by the negative if this restriction
is put at the boundary of the set of Gaussian states, and
establish a strong no-go theorem for Gaussian QBC pro-
tocols. Specifically, for any Gaussian QBC protocol, we
find a corresponding Gaussian cheating strategy. More-
over, we provide a constructive attack for any CV QBC
protocol, whereas constructive attacks were previously
known for finite dimensions only.
Let us first recall some notions linked to the distin-
guishability of quantum states. The fidelity between two
states ρ and σ is defined as F(ρ, σ) = (Tr√√ρσ√ρ)2.
If ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| and σ = |φ〉〈φ| are pure states, the fidelity
is simply |〈ψ|φ〉|2. Any purifications |ψ〉 of ρ and |φ〉
of σ satisfy F(ψ, φ) ≤ F(ρ, σ). Uhlmann’s theorem [17]
states that this inequality can always be saturated, that
is, there exists a purification of ρ (resp. σ) noted |ψ′〉
(resp. |φ′〉) which is such that F(ψ′, φ′) = F(ρ, σ). Al-
though this has been shown regardless of the dimension,
constructive proofs of this purification are known in fi-
nite dimensions only [18]. The trace distance between
the states ρ and σ is defined as D(ρ, σ) = 12 ‖ρ− σ‖1,
where ‖τ‖1 = Tr
√
τ †τ for any operator τ . The trace dis-
tance is related to the guessing probability 12 (1+D(ρ, σ)),
which is the maximum probability of distinguishing the
two states with the best measurement. We also recall a
useful relation between the fidelity and trace distance,
D(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1−F(ρ, σ), (1)
as well as the Bhattacharyya bound [19, 20], namely
1−D(ρ, σ) ≤ Tr(√ρ√σ). (2)
Quantum bit commitment — Formally, any (reduced)
QBC protocol can be described as follows: Alice encodes
her bit b into a pure bipartite state |ψb〉 ans sends one
half to Bob. At the end of the committing phase, Bob
holds either ρ0 = TrA|ψ0〉〈ψ0| or ρ1 = TrA|ψ1〉〈ψ1| if Alice
wants to commit to 0 or 1, respectively. The protocol is
referred to as ε-concealing if D(ρ0, ρ1) ≤ ε, which means
that Bob cannot learn the value of b, except with prob-
ability ε. To reveal her bit, Alice sends the other half
of |ψb〉. In a so-called δ-cheating strategy, Alice sends
a state ρ] in the committing phase and then decides to
follow a strategy leading to a final state of her choice,
|ψ]0〉 or |ψ]1〉, so that Bob should not be able to distin-
guish this strategy from a honest strategy with a proba-
bility greater than δ. This means that D(ρ], ρb) ≤ δ and
D(ψ]b, ψb) ≤ δ. Here, we will only consider the simple
strategy in which ρ] = ρ0 and |ψ]0〉 = |ψ0〉. Thus, |ψ]1〉
will correspond to Alice initially committing to a zero
and then cheating so to make it a one. Without loss of
generality, we will also consider that |ψb〉 are 2n-mode
states and ρb are n-mode states. Now, let us state our
main result:
Theorem 1 Given any ε-concealing Gaussian quantum
bit commitment protocol to Bob, there exists a Gaussian√
2ε-cheating strategy for Alice.
For finite-dimensional protocols, the cheating strategy
is usually exhibited with the help of Uhlmann’s theo-
rem, which gives purifications |ψ0〉 of ρ0 and |ψ1〉 of ρ1
such that F(ψ0, ψ1) = F(ρ0, ρ1). Unfortunately, it is not
known how to use this theorem to explicitly construct
such purifications in infinite dimensions, and, even so, it
would not help making statements about the Gaussianity
of such purifications for Gaussian states. Our approach
is based instead on the notion of intrinsic purification,
for which we give an explicit construction guarantee-
ing that every Gaussian state has a Gaussian intrinsic
purification. Although this purification does not reach
Uhlmann’s bound, we derive an inequality which is suf-
ficient to prove our theorem:
Lemma 1 Given the n-mode states ρ0 and ρ1, there exist
2n-mode purifications |ψˆ0〉 of ρ0 and |ψˆ1〉 of ρ1 such that
D(ψˆ0, ψˆ1) ≤
√
2D(ρ0, ρ1). (3)
Moreover, if ρ0 and ρ1 are Gaussian states, so are their
purifications |ψˆ0〉 and |ψˆ1〉.
Gaussian formalism — The state ρ of an n-mode
bosonic quantum system is a unit-trace Hermitian pos-
itive semi-definite operator on H⊗n, where H is the
infinite-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by the exci-
tations of each mode. We note i = i1 . . . in and |i〉 =
|i1〉 · · · |in〉, where {|i〉} is the Fock basis of H. Since H is
isomorphic to L2(R), any state ρ is completely character-
ized by its Wigner functionWρ, a quasi-probability distri-
bution in the 2n−dimensional phase space parametrized
by the vector of quadratures ξ = (x1, p1, . . . , xn, pn).
The covariance matrix γ of Wρ is a real, symmetric
and positive matrix satisfying the Heisenberg inequality
γ + iΩ ≥ 0 where Ω = ⊕nk=1 [ 0 1−1 0 ]. An n-mode state is
called Gaussian if its Wigner function is Gaussian,
Wρ(ξ) =
1
(2pi)n
√
det γ
exp
{
−1
2
(ξ − µ)T γ−1(ξ − µ)
}
.
Note that a Gaussian state is fully described by its first-
and second-order moments µ ∈ R2n and γ ∈ R2n × R2n.
A Gaussian operation E maps any Gaussian state to
a Gaussian state. Therefore, E is fully characterized by
its action on the first- and second-order moments of a
state. Furthermore, E is a Gaussian unitary operator if
3and only if there exists a symplectic matrix S (such that
SΩST = Ω) and a displacement vector d such that for all
states ρ, WE(ρ)(ξ) = Wρ(S−1ξ− d) [21]. The Williamson
decomposition theorem states that a covariance matrix
γ is described by its symplectic eigenvalues {ν1, . . . , νn}.
More specifically, for any γ, there exists a symplectic
transformation S such that SγST =
⊕n
k=1 νkI2, with
νk ≥ 1 [22]. In particular, for a Gaussian state ρ, there
exists a Gaussian operation V , a Williamson unitary,
such that V †ρV =
∑
i
(∏n
k=1(1− xk)xikk
) |i〉〈i|, where
xk =
νk−1
νk+1
. In other words, any Gaussian state ρ can be
mapped via a Gaussian operation V onto a tensor prod-
uct of thermal states with symplectic eigenvalues νk.
Gaussian intrinsic purification — Let ρ be a n-mode
state and U be a diagonalization of ρ in the Fock basis,
that is, U is a unitary operator such that 〈i|U†ρU |j〉 =
pi δij, where δij is the Kronecker delta. We then define
an intrinsic purification |ψˆ〉 of ρ as
|ψˆ〉 = (U∗ ⊗ U)
∑
i
√
pi|i〉|i〉. (4)
(Note that it is not unique.) Here and in what fol-
lows, A∗ (resp. AT ) denotes the complex conjugate
(resp. the transpose) of any linear operator A rela-
tively to the Fock basis, defined as 〈i|A∗|j〉 = 〈i|A|j〉∗
and 〈i|AT |j〉 = 〈j|A|i〉.
A Gaussian intrinsic purification of a Gaussian state
ρ thus consists in choosing U = V , that is, using a
Williamson unitary in order to diagonalize ρ in the Fock
basis. Let us show that this purification is indeed Gaus-
sian. The state
∑
i
√
pi|i〉|i〉, being a tensor product of
two-mode squeezed states, is Gaussian. Since U is a
Gaussian unitary operator, all is left to show in order to
prove that |ψˆ〉 is a Gaussian state is that U∗ is a Gaussian
unitary operator too. Let us take an arbitrary n-mode
Gaussian state τ and assume that U is described by the
symplectic matrix S and displacement vector d. We want
to show that applying U∗ to τ is equivalent to applying
the symplectic matrix ΣnZS
−1ΣnZ and the displacement
ΣnZd in the phase space. We first note that U
∗ = (U†)T
and observe that U∗τU∗
†
= (UτTU†)T . The transposi-
tion has a simple expression in phase space, namely, for
all states σ, WσT (ξ) = Wσ(Σ
n
Zξ) where Σ
n
Z =
⊕n
k=1 σZ
[23]. This leads us to the relation
W
U∗τU∗† (ξ) = Wτ (Σ
n
ZS
−1ΣnZξ − ΣnZd). (5)
To conclude, we observe that (ΣnZS
−1ΣnZ)
−1 = ΣnZSΣ
n
Z
is a symplectic matrix since ΣnZΩ(Σ
n
Z)
T = −Ω.
Let us now proceed with the proof of Lemma 1, which
is based on the intrinsic purifications |ψˆ0〉 and |ψˆ1〉 of the
n-mode states ρ0 and ρ1. We start with the decomposi-
tion of |ψb〉 as |ψb〉 = (U∗b ⊗Ub)
∑
i
√
pb,i|i〉|i〉. Using the
basis {U0|k〉}k, we can write Tr(√ρ0√ρ1) as∑
i,j,k
√
p0,ip1,j (〈k|U†0 )U0|i〉〈i|U†0U1|j〉〈j|U†1 (U0|k〉), (6)
and the inner product 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 as∑
i,j
√
p0,ip1,j 〈i|(U†0U1)∗|j〉〈i|U†0U1|j〉. (7)
Using |〈ψ0|ψ1〉| =
√F(ψ0, ψ1) and the definition of U∗,
a straightforward calculation then shows that
Tr(
√
ρ0
√
ρ1) =
√
F(ψˆ0, ψˆ1). (8)
Combining Eq. (8) with inequality (2) gives
1−D(ρ0, ρ1) ≤
√
F(ψˆ0, ψˆ1), (9)
which, together with inequality (1), yields
D(ψˆ0, ψˆ1) ≤
√
2D(ρ0, ρ1)−D(ρ0, ρ1)2. (10)
This immediately concludes the proof of Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2 Let |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 be 2n-mode Gaussian states
such that TrA|ψ0〉〈ψ0| = TrA|ψ1〉〈ψ1|, there exists a Gaus-
sian unitary operator U acting on n modes such that
(U ⊗ I)|ψ0〉 = |ψ1〉, where I is the identity on n modes.
In the discrete-variable case, this is a consequence of the
Schmidt decomposition of |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉. Here, this role
is played by the normal mode decomposition [24]. Noting
as µb =
[
µAb
µBb
]
and γb =
[
γAb Cb
CTb γ
B
b
]
the first- and second-
order moments of |ψb〉, the perfectly concealing condition
TrA|ψ0〉〈ψ0| = TrA|ψ1〉〈ψ1| implies that µB0 = µB1 and
γB0 = γ
B
1 . As a consequence, γ
A
0 and γ
A
1 have the same
symplectic spectra, so that, by applying the normal mode
decomposition on γ0 and γ1 we know that there exist
symplectic matrices Sjb such that:
γ0 = (S
A
0 ⊕ SB0 )γ˜(SA0 ⊕ SB0 )t, (11)
γ1 = (S
A
1 ⊕ SB1 )γ˜(SA1 ⊕ SB1 )t. (12)
SB0 and S
B
1 can be chosen equal since γ
B
0 = γ
B
1 . The
symplectic matrix S = SA1 (SA0 )−1 ⊕ I2n transforms γ0
into γ1 by acting on Alice’s modes only. Similarly, the
displacement µ1 − Sµ0 transforms µ0 into µ1 by acting
on Alice’s side only, which proves Lemma 2. 
Perfectly concealing protocols — We now turn to the
proof of our no-go theorem for Gaussian QBC. For per-
fectly concealing protocols (ε=0), Alice’s cheating strat-
egy is well-known: she simply applies an appropriate uni-
tary operation to her half of |ψb〉 between the two stages
of the protocol. This allows her to convert |ψ0〉 into |ψ1〉.
In the case of Gaussian QBC, Lemma 2 implies that this
cheating unitary is Gaussian.
ε-concealing protocols — We now investigate the real-
istic case where the protocol is not perfectly concealing,
which will finally lead us to the proof of Theorem 1. We
want to find an explicit Gaussian
√
2ε-cheating strategy
4for Alice against a ε-concealing QBC protocol. In the
first stage of the protocol, Alice creates the state |ψ0〉
and sends ρ0 to Bob. In the second stage, if Alice wants
to reveal the bit 0, she sends her half of |ψ0〉 to Bob, while
if she decides to reveal the bit 1, she applies a Gaussian
unitary operation to her half of |ψ0〉, mapping it to |ψ]1〉,
and then sends it to Bob.
As a consequence of Lemma 1, there exist Gaussian pu-
rifications |ψˆ0〉 of ρ0 and |ψˆ1〉 of ρ1 such that D(ψˆ0, ψˆ1) ≤√
2D(ρ0, ρ1). Moreover |ψˆ0〉 and |ψ0〉 (resp. |ψˆ1〉 and
|ψ1〉) are two Gaussian purifications of the same Gaus-
sian state ρ0 (resp. ρ1), so that, according to Lemma 2,
there exists a Gaussian unitary operator U0 (resp. U1)
such that (U0⊗ I)|ψ0〉 = |ψˆ0〉 (resp. (U1⊗ I)|ψ1〉 = |ψˆ1〉).
We note |ψ]1〉 = (U−11 U0 ⊗ I)|ψ0〉 = (U−11 ⊗ I)|ψˆ0〉.
By unitary invariance of the trace distance, one has
D(ψ]1, ψ1) = D(ψˆ0, ψˆ1). Thus, for ε-concealing protocols,
we have D(ψ]1, ψ1) ≤
√
2ε, which concludes the proof of
Theorem 1. 
We have thus obtained a stronger result than the stan-
dard no-go theorem since we have shown that QBC re-
mains impossible even if Alice and Bob are restricted to
manipulate Gaussian states. Although Lemma 1 can be
seen as a weak version of Uhlmann’s theorem in the sense
that the intrinsic purification does not reach Uhlmann’s
bound, it is sufficient here because the quantities of inter-
est in terms of guessing probability are not changed. In-
terestingly, the question of whether the purifications that
saturate Uhlmann’s bound could both be chosen Gaus-
sian if the states are Gaussian is still open (although par-
tial results in this direction have been obtained in [25]).
Note also that we have an explicit construction of Alice’s
cheating purifications for any CV QBC protocol, Gaus-
sian or not. This is done by noting that the Gaussian
constraint can be relaxed in the proof of Lemma 1, and
that Lemma 2 can be replaced by the usual Schmidt de-
composition.
CBH theorem — Consider the subset of quantum me-
chanics where only Gaussian states and operations are
allowed. As a result of our no-go theorem, this Gaussian
model forbids bit commitment while it allows uncondi-
tional secret key distribution [15]. Interestingly, however,
it is stricly included in quantum mechanics since, for in-
stance, Bell inequalities cannot be violated with Gaussian
states and measurements. This contradicts the Brassard-
Fuchs conjecture. Furthermore, according to the CBH
theorem [11], quantum mechanics can be rederived from
the sole assumptions that signalling, broadcasting, and
bit commitment are impossible in Nature. While this
idea is very appealing, the Gaussian model again pro-
vides a natural counter-example to it. The reason is that
the CBH theorem actually requires the further assump-
tion that the physical description of Nature is done within
the framework of C∗-algebras (Spekkens had found a toy
model compatible with CBH but distinct from quantum
mechanics [26], but ours is physically better grounded).
Conclusion — We have addressed continuous-variable
quantum bit commitment, and have proven a strong ver-
sion of the standard no-go theorem in which Alice and
Bob are restricted to Gaussian states and operations.
Our proof is based on a Gaussian purification of Gaus-
sian states, eliminating the need for Uhlmann’s theorem.
Note that Bob is not restricted to Gaussian measure-
ments at the last stage of the protocol, which may make
him more powerful than in a fully Gaussian protocol.
Even then, Alice can always perform a Gaussian cheat-
ing strategy. This leaves open, however, the possible ex-
istence of non-Gaussian QBC protocols that could be se-
cure against Gaussian attacks. More fundamentally, we
have exhibited a physically motivated counter-example
to the attempts at rederiving quantum mechanics from
first principles.
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